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Abstract
Transportation economists apply different labor supply models when studying anti-
congestion policy: (i) endogenous working hours; (ii) endogenous workdays but given
daily working hours; (iii) labor supply as a residual. We study whether the outcome
of anti-congestion policies that change the relative cost of labor supply margins, and,
thus, may affect decisions on working hours and working days, is robust against the
model applied. In particular, we focus on welfare implications in the presence of
other taxes when there is a congestion externality. We find surprisingly strong
differences in quantity and sign. Further, we develop a clear recommendation for
future research on issues that include decisions on commuting trips. Researchers
shall apply both a model of endogenous working hours that provides an upper limit
and a model of endogenous workdays that provide a lower limit of results for welfare
changes, optimal policies and two optimal tax components (Pigouvian and Ramsey
terms).
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1 Introduction
Intensive and extensive margins of labor supply are imperfect substitutes and, thus, distinct
decision variables of workers (Hanoch, 1976; Blank, 1988).1 This is usually traced back to
xed costs of the extensive margin (participation, Cogan, 1981; Hamermesh, 1996).2 These
ndings initiated new research on optimal income taxation where the extensive margin,
usually modeled as a discrete choice (Cogan, 1981), plays a decisive role (Diamond, 1980;
Saez, 2002; Laroque, 2005) 3. Extensions to tax and welfare reforms conrm this relevance
owing to rst-order eects that result from participation responses (Eissa and Hoynes,
2004)4.
Much less is known about other margins. There is tentative evidence that commut-
ing costs, that add to xed costs of workdays5, aect daily working hours (Gutiérrez-i-
Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010; Gimenez-Nadal et al., 2016), but evidence concerning
the impact on workdays is inconclusive (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010;
Van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, 2011). Rather limited is research on workday
elasticities (Dechter, 2013). Given that, researchers feel free in modeling labor supply even
if policies considered aect the costs of workdays. They assume that labor supply and
leisure demand is constant (Anas and Rhee, 2007; Parry and Small, 2009)6, is the residual
of time endowment net of travel time (Brueckner, 2005)7 or is a decision variable where
the endogenous margin is either working hours8 (Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2002; Parry and
Small, 2005)9 or workdays (Arnott, 2007; De Borger and Wuyts, 2009).10
Given this variety, there is a surprising lack of knowledge of how policy evaluation is
aected by labor supply modeling (LSM)11. As we argue below, this is a reason for concern.
We explore this issue and ask whether policy evaluation is robust against the modeling of
leisure demand and supply of workdays and working hours.
But why should modeling those margins be important considering that labor supply
1See also Hanoch (1980a), Hanoch (1980b), Hamermesh (1996). Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and
Heckman (1993) report a strong inuence of the extensive margin on observed labor supply. Blundell et al.
(2011a,b) provide the margins for the US, UK and France. Labor supply elasticities dier among extensive
and intensive margins (recent reviews by Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber, 2012; Keane, 2011; Chetty,
2012) and among the life-cycle (Keane and Wasi, 2016).
2Costs of the extensive margin are, e.g., application costs, relocation costs, tax declaration costs, costs
of searching for child care or changes in social security contributions or claims.
3See also Kleven and Kreiner (2006). A recent review is Piketty and Saez (2014).
4See also Immervoll et al. (2007); Eissa et al (2008).
5Fixed costs of days are, for instance, commuting costs, taxes on traveling, parking fees, child transport
costs or child care costs.
6See De Borger and Wouters (1998); Calthrop et al. (2000); Martin (2001);
Kwon (2005); Bento et al. (2006); Brueckner (2007); McDonald (2009); Parry and Timilsina (2010); Kono
et al. (2012); De Lara et al. (2013).
7Further, Sullivan (1983a,b,c); Wrede (2001); Rossi-Hansberg (2004); De Borger and Wuyts (2011a);
Fetene et al. (2016).
8This includes all models that do not explicitly distinguish between margins. If xed costs of the
margins dier, these models imply that some margins, e.g. workdays, are xed.
9See also White (1977, 1988); Hotchkiss and White (1993); Parry (1995); Anas and Kim (1996); Parry
and Bento (2002); De Palma and Lindsey (2004); Anas and Rhee (2006); West and Williams (2007); Van
Ommeren and Fosgerau (2009); Fujishima (2011); Olwert and Guldmann (2012); Tscharaktschiew (2014,
2015).
10Others include Calthrop (2001); Parry and Bento (2001); De Borger and Van Dender (2003); Van
Dender (2003); Berg (2007); Pilegaard and Fosgerau (2008); Rhee (2008, 2009); De Borger and Wuyts
(2011b); Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010a,b, 2012); Hirte and Tscharaktschiew (2013a,b, 2015); Nitzsche
and Tscharaktschiew (2013).
11The abbreviation `LSM' refers to `labor supply model' as well as `labor supply modeling' depending
on the context.
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elasticities are small for some groups of workers?12 The answer is that there are many
groups whose number of workdays (workweeks) per year is variable since they decide on
participation, parental leave, sabbaticals, overtime, part-time or use worktime accounts.13
With that in mind, we expect to nd a systematic inuence of LSM since pricing instru-
ments such as fuel taxes, congestion tolls and cordon tolls aect the workday costs but not
those of daily working hours. If workdays are not explicitly modeled in such cases substitu-
tion eects between the margins are neglected. Further dierences among the LSMs result
from the time perspective. Modeling xed or residual labor supply implies a short-term
perspective though many studies making these assumptions look at the long term (e.g.,
spatial patterns).
Our research strategy is as follows: We, rst, introduce six LSMs and show how the
value of time (VOT) diers between them, thereby focusing on two margins: daily working
hours and annual workdays.14 We distinguish the case that working hours are endogenous
but workdays are xed (the workhours approach, WH), that there is a workday choice but
working hours are exogenous (the workdays approach, WD), and the case of a hybrid model
(HY)  which has never been applied to policy evaluation  where workers decide on both
working hours and workdays (based on Hanoch, 1976; Oi, 1976; Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980). In each case, we model leisure as either homogeneous or inhomogeneous across types
of day. This adds to the literature on the VOT (see the review by Small, 2012) which does
not yet derive VOTs in case both working and non-working days are endogenous.15
After that, we implement dierent margins of labor supply in the well-known approach
provided by Parry and Small (2005) used to derive and calculate optimal fuel taxes. This
allows us to derive the impact of labor supply margins on the components of the optimal
tax. We apply Monte Carlo simulations to explore how the optimal fuel taxes depend on
the elasticities of the dierent margins of labor supply and how they interact with other
parameters. This reveals that magnitudes as well as signs of the Ramsey components
depend on the specic labor supply model. We, further, show that the endogenous working
hours model provides an upper limit while the endogenous working day approach gives the
lower limit of the optimal fuel tax and the Ramsey tax component.
In the next stage, we use this result when moving on to a spatial general equilibrium
framework (Anas and Xu, 1999) that we apply to study the eect of anti-congestion policies
in an urban economy.16 Here, workers adjust labor supply along the two margins and may
choose to relocate. The latter strongly aects travel costs and wages, thus adding discrete
changes in labor supply. To discriminate between decisions on hours and days, we focus on
policies that aect the xed costs of workdays. These are policies aimed at curbing trac
congestion: (1) Pigouvian congestion tolls, (2) cordon tolls, (3) miles tax, (4) enhancing
infrastructure capacity, and (5) land-use type regulation (zoning). We analytically derive
welfare changes and show how the labor supply modeling aect the welfare components
before we apply simulations to identify signs and quantify the eects. We nd that the labor
supply modeling aect magnitude as well as sign and, further, conrm that the workhours
12A recent review is (Blundell et al., 2013). More references see below.
13The groups dier across countries (Bick, Brüggemann et al., 2016).
14Annual workdays also reect participation decisions (see Blundell et al., 2013).
15Only few studies consider time use on working and non-working days (Gronau, 1986) or multiday
time allocation of non-working activities between both types of days (Yamamoto and Kitamura, 1999).
However, days are xed in these studies.
16The other non-monocentric model available is Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002). They consider ag-
glomeration eects that we neglect here, though they are modeled in the Anas-Xu-world, too (Rhee et al.,
2014). The Anas-Xu model with xed workdays is applied to congestion policies by Anas and Hiramatsu
(2012, 2013). A minor reason for using a spatial approach is that more than half of the literature cited
above applies spatial models.
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model (WH) provides an upper limit of the results while the workdays approach (WD)
provides a lower limit. Interestingly, results of zoning do hardly depend on LSM.17
Our results oer a strategy for the choice of LSM. In general, we suggest that both WH
and WD should be applied whenever a policy asymmetrically aects the xed costs of the
margins because these span the interval of results. This strategy is useful as a shortcut
given the missing knowledge on elasticities in a hybrid model. Of course, the hybrid model
(HY) should be preferred if elasticities are well specied.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce LSMs and derive VOTs. Next, we
apply the Parry and Small approach to calculate optimal fuel taxes. In Section 4 we derive
welfare eects of anti-congestion policies  choosing Pigouvian tolls as the example  and
study how they depend on LSMs in the spatial, general equilibrium model. Subsequently,
we use numerical simulations to nd magnitude and sign of the eects of this and other
policies considered. Eventually, we nish with some conclusions.
2 Labor supply approaches and VOT
Let us set the scene. We introduce the six LSMs, derive the value of time (VOT) and
value of travel time savings (VTTS)18 to see the dierence between the LSMs. Thereby,
` denotes leisure on a workday D, l is leisure on a non-working day L, h is daily working
hours, e is daily time endowment, and E is days per year. If leisure is homogeneous, leisure
L is the sum of leisure on workdays L1 ≡ `D and leisure on non-working days L2 ≡ lL,
while both are distinct arguments of utility otherwise. If traveling aects utility (De Serpa,
1971), the well behaved utility function is
(a) u = u (z,L1,L2, tzz, tD) , (b) u = u (z,L, tzz, tD) , (1)
where z is consumption assumed to be equivalent to the number of shopping trips19. tz and
t are two-way shopping travel and commuting time per trip20. A worker's monetary budget
constraint is (p+ cz)z = (wnh− c)D, where p is the price of z, cz and c are monetary two-
way travel costs per shopping trip and commuting trip respectively, wn = w (1− τw) is the
hourly net wage, w is the hourly wage and τw is the wage tax rate. The time constraints
on workdays and non-working days in annual terms are eD = (h+ t)D + `D + btzz and
eL = lL+ (1− b) tzz where b is the share of shopping on workdays and E = D + L is the
annual days restriction.
HY is the general model where workers choose both daily working hours and annual
workdays (hybrid model). We distinguish (1a) HY with inhomogeneous leisure and (1b)
HY with homogeneous leisure.
1a) Concerning HY with inhomogeneous leisure, maximization of (a) in Eq. (1) w. r. t. z,
`, D, h, l, and L subject to the budget constraints implies
VOTh:
µ
λ
= wn, VOTl:
ρ
λ
= wn − νtt+ c
e
, (2)
17This indicates that the current state of knowledge in the literature that zoning approximates Pigouvian
tolls (e.g., Rhee et al., 2014) may hold only for a specic LSM.
18Becker (1965); Johnson (1966); Oort (1969), and De Serpa (1971) develop the theory of time evaluation.
Recent works include Jara-Díaz (2007); Small and Verhoef (2007), and Jara-Díaz (2008) (see the review
by Small, 2012).
19If there is no further restriction, people always ll up the car at each shopping trip to exploit economies
of scale in shopping trips.
20By assuming that travel time of shopping and commuting enters utility as distinct arguments, VTTS
of both types of traveling may dier. While there is some evidence that this is the case, there is no clear
tendency on average (see the review of Mackie et al., 2001; the meta-analysis of Abantes and Wardman,
2011).
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where λ, µ, ρ are the Lagrangian multipliers of the budget constraint and the time
restrictions on workdays and non-working days. νt is the VTTS of commuting (νt ≡
wn − utλ ), where
ut
λ is the disutility of traveling (Small, 2012). VOTh  the "value
of time as a resource" (De Serpa, 1971) on workdays  equals the hourly net wage.
VOTl is the VOT as a resource on a non-working day not yet found in the literature.
It represents the opportunity costs of an hour on a nonworking day, i.e. the hourly
net wage minus average xed costs of a workday: average generalized commuting
costs arising when turning the non-working day into a workday. Owing to these
costs VOTs dier.
1b) In HY with homogeneous leisure we use (b) in Eq. (1). Due to economies of scale
workers want to use all available daily time for working and none for leisure. To
avoid this, we constraint leisure to ` ≥ ¯̀.21
2a) In WH with inhomogeneous leisure workdays are constant (D̄ substitutes D), there
is no annual day restriction and we use (a) in Eq. (1).
2b) In WH with homogeneous leisure we use (b) in Eq. (1), D̄ substitutes D and there
is no annual day restriction.
3a) In WD with inhomogeneous leisure daily working hours are xed (h̄ substitutes h)
and (a) is used in Eq. (1).
3b) In WD with homogeneous leisure we use (b) in Eq. (1) and h̄.
Table 1: Time values in dierent labor supply approaches
Approach u VOTh:
µ
λ VOTl:
ρ
λ =
1
e
γ
λ VTTS: νt
HYinhomog. u (...,L1,L2) wn wn − νtt+ce w
n − utλ
homog. u (...,L) wn wn − νtt+c
e−¯̀ w
n − utλ
WHinhomog. u (...,L1,L2) wn ρλ w
n − utλ
homog. u (...,L) wn wn wn − utλ
WDinhomog. u (...,L1,L2) µλ
µ
λ +
(
wn − µλ
)
h̄
e −
νtt+c
e
µ
λ −
ut
λ
homog. u (...,L) wn − νtt+c
h̄+t
wn − νtt+c
h̄+t
wn − utλ
VOT of hours on workdays (VOTh), VOT of hours on non-working days (VOTl). VTTS value of travel
time savings for commuting trips. HY hybrid model, WH workhours model, WD workdays model.
Table 1 displays the VOTs and VTTS of the LSMs. The VOT on a workday, VOTh,
equals the net wage wn whenever daily hours are endogenous (HY, WH). In WD with
inhomogeneous leisure, the restriction for leisure is binding and VOTh is the shadow price
µ
λ . In case of homogeneous leisure only workdays are endogenous in WD and VOTh is the
daily available wage income in terms of time spent working plus commuting.
The VOT on non-working days, VOTl, depends on average commuting costs if work-
days are endogenous (HY, WD). In general, average costs depend on the hours available
for time use decisions. In HY with homogeneous leisure, e.g., less time is available for
working on account of the binding leisure restriction. A policy that aects generalized
21` = ¯̀, as we show in Appendix A
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travel costs changes VOTl only in HY and WD with inhomogeneous leisure, aects both
VOTs in a symmetric way in WD with homogeneous leisure, but is neutral for both VOTs
in WH. Changes in wage taxes aect both VOTs, but in inhomogeneous models and the
homogeneous HY approach in a dierent way.22
3 Optimal fuel taxes and the margins of labor supply
Next, we calculate optimal fuel taxes in the well-known approach of Parry and Small
(2005). We derive the optimal tax formula to understand the role of the margins of labor
supply. Then, we apply Monte Carlo simulations to examine the role of the elasticities of
the labor supply margins. This is particularly valuable since to our knowledge estimates
of the compensated elasticity of workdays are not yet available.23 We choose the approach
of Parry and Small (2005) (PS, henceforth) to explore analytically and by Monte Carlo
simulations how LSMs aect the optimal tax rate and its components and how the results
depend on labor supply elasticities and other parameters. Thereby we consider the homo-
geneous leisure, workhours model (WH), the inhomogeneous leisure, workdays approach
(WD) and the inhomogeneous leisure, hybrid approach (HY).
We start with the PS model but decompose miles into non-commuting and commuting
miles and leisure into leisure on workdays and leisure on non-workdays. The well-behaved
utility function is
U = u
[
ϕ [(Z,Mo, T o, G) ,MD, TD,L1, L
]
− φ (P )− δ (A) (3)
where Z is consumption, Mo is annual vehicle miles traveled (VMT), T 0 is total travel
time both except for commuting, and G is public expenditure.
We follow PS and assume thatMo is produced through fuel consumption F o and other
monetary travel costs Co (Mo = Mo(F o, Co)). We add total commuting time TD = tMD
with t as travel time per VMT and MD = mD as commuting miles traveled, where
m = m (f, c) is average miles on a two-way commuting trip depending on fuel consumption
f and monetary costs c per trip. Z, Mo, T o, G (see PS) and m are assumed to be weakly
separable from leisure decisions.24 L1 = `D, `, D and L are dened above.25 Aggregate
miles traveled are M = Mo + MD and aggregate travel time is T = T o + TD. φ (P ) and
δ (A) are externalities of pollution P and accidents A both depending on M . Further, Mo
is traveled only on workdays.
Assuming that pZ = 1 = w, the monetary budget constraint (Z + pFF + C = I, I ≡
(1− τw)H) states that expenditures on consumption, fuel F = F o + fD and monetary
travel costs C = Co + cD equal net income from working with the wage tax rate τw and
annual hours of work H ≡ hD. pF = qF+ τF is the gross price of fuel, qF the net price
and τF the fuel tax rate. The time constraint on workdays is H + L1 + T = eD, and the
annual days constraint E = D + L. In analogy to PS, we can derive the optimal fuel tax
22Adding heterogeneity of households, these VOTs become heterogeneous too (Small et al., 2005). This
is considered in the simulation below.
23Dechter (2013) provides only estimates of the uncompensated elasticity of workdays.
24This assumption is required to apply the PS framework with all its power. It implies that the choice of
m  route choice, mode choice, car type choice, residence location choice  does not depend on the number
of commutes D.
25Since time endowment e on a non-working day is constant we can use L instead of L2 = eL.
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for HY26 (see Appendix A):
τF =
adjusted Pigouvian tax (≈PS)︷ ︸︸ ︷
MEC/ (1 +MEB) +

Ramsey annual (PS)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− ηMI) εcHw
ηFF
Ramsey days︷ ︸︸ ︷
−
σmε
c
Dw
ηFF
 τwpF1− τw (4)
+ β
M
F
Ec
 congestion feedback (PS)︷ ︸︸ ︷εHw − (1− ηMI) εcHw +
feedback commuting︷ ︸︸ ︷
σmε
c
Dw
 τw
1− τw
,
β =
ηMF
ηFF
; σm =
MD
M
; ηMI ≡ (1− σm) ηMoI + σmηmI . (5)
MEC are marginal external costs and MEB is the marginal excess burden of taxation as
dened by PS27, εcHw and ε
c
Dw are the compensated wage elasticities of aggregate labor sup-
ply and workdays, εHw is the uncompensated wage elasticity of aggregate working hours,
ηMI is the aggregate income elasticity of VMT, ηmI the income elasticity of commuting
miles given the number of workdays, ηMoI is the income elasticity of non-commuting miles,
ηFF the own price elasticity of fuel consumption, and σm the share of commuting miles on
aggregate VMT. All elasticities are expressed as positive numbers. Ec is the congestion
externality
Ec = νMt′ = νoMot′ + νtmDt′, (6)
where νo = 1 − τw − uToλ and ν
t = 1 − τw − uTDλ are the VTTS of non-commuting and
commuting VMT, respectively.
According to PS, the optimal fuel tax (4) depends on three components: the adjusted
Pigouvian term (rst term on the right-hand side), the Ramsey term (second row) and the
congestion feedback (second term). We add another Ramsey term (`Ramsey days') and
another congestion feedback (`feedback commuting'). These account for the compensated
eects of commuting trips owing to their complementarity to workdays.
The adjusted Pigouvian term is almost constant because we use xed elasticities for
the externalities such that the Pigouvian term does not explicitly depend on D.
The Ramsey term captures the eciency gain from the wage tax reduction (revenue
recycling) and the eciency loss from the reduction in labor supply due to the fuel tax (tax
interaction). In PS, the latter is the eect of the change in income from the compensated
labor supply response on VMT, while, here, the compensated response of workdays adds
a compensated eect on commuting trips. This exacerbates the negative tax interaction
eect.
The congestion feedback eect arises since higher travel costs mitigates congestion
which eventually leads to more labor supply. PS measure it through the income eect on
VMT and labor supply initiated by the compensated change in labor supply. The new
term we add is the eect of the compensated supply of workdays which impacts VMT
through its complementarity with commuting trips.
Both new eects vanish if εcDw = 0 and reach a maximum at ε
c
Dw = ε
c
Hw the upper limit
for εcDw. If ε
c
Dw = 0 and there is weak separability between travel and leisure, the taxed
good (miles) is a weak substitute for leisure and, thus, should be taxed relatively heavy,
26The optimal fuel tax for WH and WD can be found by assuming εcDw = 0 or ε
c
Dw = ε
c
Hw.
27MEC = EPF +
(
Ec + EPM + EA
)
βM
F
; MEBH =
τw εHw
1−τw(1+εHw)
. EPF , EPM are pollution external-
ities from fuel consumption and miles and EA denotes externalities from accidents as dened by PS (see
Appendix B).
6
provided ηmI < 1 (PS). If ε
c
Dw > 0 the new Ramsey term absolutely exceeds the new
congestion feedback and the optimal fuel tax is below the PS fuel tax, the more the higher
εcDw. Then the taxed good is increasingly substitutable to leisure and tax interaction may
exceed revenue recycling.28
In a rst experiment, we calculate the US and UK optimal fuel tax and their components
for HY and vary the Hicksian elasticity of workdays εcDw from ε
c
Dw = 0 (WH) to ε
c
Dw = ε
c
Hw
(WD). Basic elasticities and parameters are taken from PS. We add the annual share of
commuting on VMT, which is 0.28 (0.275) for the US (UK),29 and choose εcDw = 0.2 as
benchmark.3031
Table 2: Fuel taxes with variation of Hicks elasticity of days (HY)
US UK
εcDw τ
F Pigou Ramsey CongF τF Pigou Ramsey CongF
0.00∗ 101 74 26 1 134 104 23 7
0.10 96 74 20 1 125 103 14 8
0.20 90 73 15 2 116 101 5 10
0.30 85 72 10 2 108 100 -3 11
0.35∗∗ 82 72 7 2 104 99 -7 12
∗εcDw = 0 is WH.
∗∗εcDw = 0.35 = ε
c
Hw is WD. Source: own calculations.
Since the endogeneity of workdays adds an tax interaction term, the optimal fuel tax
and the Ramsey term decline when the workday elasticity increases (see Table 2). The
optimal fuel tax for the US (UK) is between 81 and 100% (78 and 100%) of the PS fuel tax.32
The Ramsey term varies strikingly. It is between 100 and 27% (100 and −35%) of the PS
results for US (UK). WH (εcDw = 0) provides the maximum and WD (ε
c
Dw = ε
c
Hw = 0.35)
the minimum of the optimal fuel tax and the Ramsey component and, vice versa, for the
congestion feedback.
Analytically, the strength of the eects depends on the interaction of the Hicksian
workdays elasticity with other parameters that are not exactly known. We study this
interaction by Monte Carlo simulations where six central parameters are varied: εcDw, ε
c
Hw,
28This is in contrast to the ndings of the early double-dividend literature where the negative tax
interaction eect always dominates the positive revenue recycling eect (Parry, 1995, 1997). Three reasons
have been reported why the recycling eect may dominate (Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002): rst, the initial
labor tax is not optimal so that the Ramsey component matters (Parry and Small, 2005), second, there are
general equilibrium changes in prices since the reduction of the externality capitalizes in land rents (Bento
et al., 2006) and, third, the taxed good is at most a weak substitute for leisure (Deaton, 1981; Parry and
Small, 2005). The second eect is signicant in the spatial model above but does not work here.
29From NTHS we calculate the averages of 2001 and 2009 VMT per year (2259.95 billion miles/year)
and annual commuting VMT (628.579 billion miles/year) (Federal Highway Administration, 2015). From
this we calculate the share of non-commuting miles on all VMT which is 0.72. For the UK, average annual
VMT per 4-wheel car in total and for commuting are 9,100 and 2,500 miles/year in 2004, respectively
(National Travel Survey, see Department of Transport, 2015). Hence, the share of non-commuting miles
on all VMT is 0.725.
30Chetty (2012) estimates average Hicksian intensive and extensive elasticities of 0.33 and 0.25, respec-
tively. Applying the ratio of both implies that 0.15 is the Hicksian extensive elasticity under the PS
assumptions of an aggregate Hicksian elasticity of 0.35. However, since decisions on days reect the exten-
sive margin but also a part of the intensive margin in the empirical literature we use 0.2 as our preferred
value for the Hicksian elasticity of days.
31Table C.1 displays the main parameters used in the Monte Carlo simulation.
32Because we are interested in the eects of LSMs on the ndings we stick to the original PS data and
calculations and do not make an update based on other studies (e.g., Bento et al., 2009; Lin and Prince,
2009; Parry and Small, 2009).
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εHw, β, ηFF
33, and ηMI . We randomly draw 10,000 values of Hicksian and Marshallian
elasticities from their empirical distributions.34 Since there are no estimates of εcD we
randomly draw it for each run from a uniform distribution over the interval from zero to
the drawn Hicksian elasticity as its upper ceiling. The other parameters  ηFF , ηMI , β 
are randomly drawn from a gamma distribution tted to the mean and interval of these
elasticities taken from PS.
Table 3: Monte Carlo simulation of optimal fuel taxes
US (1) (2) (3) UK (4) (5) (6)
WH HY WD WH HY WD
optimal fuel tax optimal fuel tax
/c/gallona probability /c/gallona probability
40 0.03 0.05 0.07 50 0.08 0.11 0.14
75 0.27 0.33 0.40 100 0.33 0.38 0.45
100 0.51 0.58 0.65 150 0.58 0.64 0.71
150 0.81 0.86 0.92 200 0.75 0.81 0.86
200 0.91 0.94 0.97 280 0.89 0.93 0.96
median 99a 92a 85a median 132a 120a 108a
Ramsey term Ramsey term
/c/gallona probability /c/gallona probability
0 0.06 0.14 0.27 0 0.23 0.38 0.54
5 0.26 0.40 0.57 5 0.38 0.53 0.70
15 0.54 0.66 0.79 15 0.57 0.70 0.82
50 0.81 0.87 0.93 50 0.80 0.87 0.93
100 0.90 0.94 0.97 100 0.89 0.93 0.97
median 13a 8a 4a median 11a 4a -1a
a /c/gallon. Monte Carlo results of US and UK optimal fuel tax. Source: own calculations.
Table 3 shows that optimal fuel taxes and Ramsey terms dier across LSMs. Columns
(1)-(3) and (4)-(6) display cumulative probabilities for both in WH, HY and WD. For
instance, according to column (1) the probability that the "true" optimal tax is not above
100 /c/gallon is 51% which rises to 65% in WD (column (3)).
If travel is a weak substitute for leisure the Ramsey term is positive since the revenue
recycling term dominates. The probability of a negative Ramsey term is 6-27% for the US
and 23-54% for the UK. The tax interaction term dominates with a higher probability in
WD than WH. As argued above, this is mainly due to the increase in the substitutability of
leisure and fuel (travel). Dierences in the optimal fuel tax are almost entirely determined
by those in the Ramsey term. Variations in the outcome are huge showing the uncertainty
concerning the optimal fuel tax.
Figure 1 provides pairwise plots of the US-results of the three LSMs.35 Panels A) and
D) show that the optimal fuel tax and the Ramsey term results of WD (vertical axis)
are below those of WH (horizontal axis), and panels B) and E) conrm this for HY, too.
Hence, WH gives the upper limit of the results independently of elasticities. Panels C) and
33As β is the ratio of ηMF and ηFF , ηMF is implicitly adjusted, too.
34We collected 129 estimates of various labor supply elasticities from well-known surveys: Pencavel
(1986); Blundell and MaCurdy (1999); Keane (2011); Chetty et al. (2011, 2012); Chetty (2012). We added
some recent estimates since they provide also estimates of the Hicksian elasticity of extensive labor supply
(participation) or Marshallian elasticities of workdays or daily working hours (Dechter, 2013; Bargain et
al., 2014). Since estimates of the elasticities are scarce we assume that each estimate is the mean of a
normally distributed elasticity that we consider when drawing values. We randomly get 10,000 values from
the adjusted empirical elasticities and exclude Hicksian elasticities below zero and Marshallian elasticities
exceeding Hicksian elasticities.
35The results for the UK look very similar. See Figure C.1
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Figure 1: Comparison of LSMs in case of US
A) fuel tax US WD/WH B) fuel tax US HY/WH C) fuel tax US HY/WD
D) Ramsey US WD/WH E) Ramsey US HY/WH F) Ramsey US HY/WD
Pairwise plots of optimal fuel taxes (upper panels; vertical and horizontal lines represent the US fuel tax
in 2005: 40 /c/gallon) and Ramsey tax terms (lower panels) for the US for the LSMs. Each dot represents
the results for the identical parameter constellation. Panels A) and D): WD vs. WH, WH is the upper
limit for WD. Panels B) and E): HY vs. WH, WH is the upper limit for HY. Panel C) and F): HY vs.
WD, WD is the lower limit for HY. A few parameter combinations produce irregularities (division by zero
etc.) Source: own calculations.
F) show that WD forms the lower boundary of HY.
4 Welfare eects of congestion policies
Next, we study the working mechanism of the LSMs in a spatial general equilibrium and
derive welfare eects and optimal Pigouvian congestion tolls. This study allows us to dis-
cuss policies that are usually discussed in the context of cities. However, we face a specic
problem. Applying Monte Carlo simulations with dierent elasticities in the spatial city
model implies to generate several thousand benchmarks  one for each draw of elasticities
 which would make cross-comparisons almost impossible and, by the way, would also be
extremely time consuming. Further, there are hardly any estimates of the elasticity of
working days so that we cannot use a specic elasticity when modeling the hybrid labor
supply approach. Instead, our strategy is relied to the ndings of the above Monte Carlo
simulation. We apply the workdays as well as the workhours model to generate the upper
and lower ceilings of the welfare eects of anti-congestion policies. The result is robust if
both provide the same sign of the welfare change for a specic policy. This approach can
be easily adapted in simulation studies.
To see whether LSM matters, we study ve anti-congestion policies usually discussed
and perform 24 simulations for each policy. We distinguish WH and WD each with homo-
geneous and inhomogeneous leisure, vary tax recycling and change landlord modeling. The
latter shows whether LSM impacts may also depend on other modeling parts of a simula-
tion model. The set of policies considered in the simulations involve: Pigouvian congestion
tolls, cordon toll, miles tax, investment in road capacities, and zoning. In the next sub-
section we adopt the congestion toll policy to provide some basic ndings. Afterwards, we
provide simulations of the full set of policies and model variants.
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4.1 The spatial model and welfare eects
The urban area consists of J zones of mixed land use where local competitive rms produce
local composite goods. We assume that congestion is present only during peak hours where
commuting takes place while o-peak shopping trips are uncongested. Commuting time
per unit of two-way distance mij from i to j, tij = tij (fij) depends, thus, on peak trac
volume-capacity ratio fij , while o-peak travel time per two-way shopping distance mik is
xed at tik, thus:
tij ≡ mijtij (fij) , tzik ≡ miktik. (7)
In the rst stage, workers decide on quantities given location ij, while they choose
residence and working locations i and j in a multinomial logit framework in the second
stage. The random utility functions of a type ij worker is the sum of deterministic utility
uij and εij , an idiosyncratic preference for location ij (Anas and Xu, 1999)
36 and diers
in the inhomogeneous and homogeneous leisure case:
U inhij = uij (zij1,...,zijJ , qij ,L1ij ,L2ij) + εij , (8)
Uhomij = uij (zij1,...,zijJ , qij ,Lij) + εij . (9)
zijk is spatially dierentiated consumption of zone k's good, qij is housing demand, L1ij ≡
`ijDij and L2ij ≡ lijLij are leisure on workdays and on non-working days.
Workers face a monetary budget constraint (10) and time constraints per workday (11),
per non-work day (12) and of days (13):∑
k
(pk + c
z
ik) zijk + riqij =
(
wnj hij − cij
)
Dij + I (10)
(hij + tijmij)Dij + `ijDij + b
∑
k
tzikmikzijk = eDij (11)
lijLij + (1− b) tzikzijk = eLij (12)
Dij + Lij = E, (13)
where pk is the price of zone k's good, cij (c
z
ik) are two-way monetary travel costs for a
commuting (shopping) trip from i to j (k), ri is the unit land price in zone i. Net income
I = ALR − τ ls is aggregate land rents per capita, ALR, minus head taxes, τ ls, wnj is the
net wage earned in zone j and b is dened above.
Based on indirect utility Vij , each worker decides on his locations ij taking into account
idiosyncratic preferences εij . Assuming εij is i.i.d.Gumbel distributed with mean zero, vari-
ance σ2 and dispersion parameter Λ = π/
(
σ
√
6
)
this implies a multinomial logit model
(MNL) with location choice probabilities (McFadden, 1973) ψij = exp (ΛVij) /
∑
a,b exp (ΛVab).
The representative rm at zone i demands land Qi and labor Mi to produce the local
good with a CRS function Xi = f (Qi,Mi). A wage tax at rate τ
w, congestion tolls of τ tij
on route ij and head taxes nance opportunity cost of roads risiAi. si is the road share
of land Ai. The public budget constraint is
τwTw +
∑
i,j
τ tijT
t
ij + τ
lsN =
∑
i
risiAi (14)
with wage tax and congestion toll bases
Tw ≡ N
∑
i,j
ψijwjHij , T
t
ij ≡ Fij = NψijDij , (15)
36Note that travel time is not an argument of utility in (8) and (9). This simplies calibration. Since
disutility of travel is not directly aected by the policies considered it shall not aect the ndings. Later
on we move to the full concept (De Serpa, 1971).
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where Hij = hijDij is annual working hours, Fij is commuting trac ow during on route
ij. The volume-capacity ratio is fij = Fij/Kij , where road capacity Kij = κij
∑
i siAi
is proportional to road area with κij as capacity scale parameter.
37 Clearing local land,
labor and consumer goods markets implies:
Ai = Qi +N
∑
j
ψijqij + siAi, (16)
Mj = N
∑
i
ψijHij , Xk = N
∑
i,j
ψijzijk. (17)
Aggregate land rents earned per capita are ALR ≡ 1N
∑
i riAi.
Welfare is the expected value of the maximized utilities (McFadden, 1973):
W = E
[
max(ij) (Vij + εij)
]
=
1
Λ
ln
∑
i,j
exp (ΛVij) . (18)
implying marginal welfare changes w.r.t. the congestion toll on route hk of
dW
dτ thk
= N
∑
i,j
ψij
dVij
dτ thk
. (19)
After applying the envelope theorem to
dVij
dτ thk
(Yu and Rhee, 2011; Rhee et al., 2014)38,
using (14), (16), (17) and the zero prot conditions and assuming head-tax revenue recy-
cling (see Appendix D), (19) becomes:39
1
λ
dW
dτ thk
=
(
MECthk − τ thk
Adjthk
−dF/dτ thk
)(
− dF
dτ thk
)
+ TIthk +RE
t
hk, (20)
where the average marginal utility of income (MUI) is dened as λ ≡
∑
i,j ψijλij , overall
trac is F =
∑
i,j Fij and changes in average marginal external congestion costs (MEC)
40
are
MECthk =
∑
i,j
ψijDijw
n
j t
′
ij
dFij/dτ
t
hk
dF/dτ thk
. (21)
Changes in trac on route ij and in overall trac are
dFij
dτ thk
= N
(
ψij
dDij
dτ thk
+Dij
dψij
dτ thk
)
,
dF
dτ thk
=
∑
i,j
dFij
dτ thk
. (22)
The adjustment term denotes the change in the link-specic toll tax base:
Adjthk ≡ −N
(
ψhk
dDhk
dτ thk
+Dhk
dψhk
dτ thk
)
. (23)
The marginal welfare eect (20) is the sum of Pigouvian (rst term on RHS), tax
interaction, TI, and redistribution eects, RE.41 The latter arises due to dierences in
MUIs across worker types ij (spatial heterogeneity). TI and RE are
TIthk ≡ τwN
∑
i,j
(
ψijwj
dHij
dτ thk
+ wjHij
dψij
dτ thk
)
(24)
+N
ψhkDhk + ∑
i,j|ij 6=hk
τ tij
(
ψij
dDij
dτ thk
+Dij
dψij
dτ thk
)
37κij may indicate quality of infrastructure on route ij.
38This is equivalent to applying Roy's identity
39Similar formulae can be derived for all other LSMs.
40Since Kij is constant
dtij
dFij
=
∂tij
∂fij
∂fij
∂Fij
=
∂tij
∂fij
1
Kij
. We dene t′ij ≡
∂tij
∂fij
1
Kij
.
41In the case of wage tax recycling a positive tax recycling eect has to be added (Parry, 1995).
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REthk ≡MECthk
(
− dF
dτ thk
)
(φmechk − 1) + Y thk
(
φyhk − 1
)
(25)
−NψhkDhk
(
φtollhk − 1
)
− τwN
∑
i,j
ψijHij
dwj
dτ thk
(φwtaxhk − 1) .
The distributional characteristics φ (Feldstein, 1972) represent the ratios of changes in
congestion externalities (φmechk ), income net of consumption and housing expenditure (φ
y
hk),
the toll base (φtoll) and wage tax revenue (φwtaxhk ) evaluated at individual MUIs to those
evaluated at average MUI. If MUIs are identical, φs are unity and RE
t
hk vanishes (φ is
dened in Appendix D).
From (20) in connection with (21) - (24) we deduce the following:
Remark 1 Decision on workdays directly aect all components of the welfare change (WD
or HY model), while decisions on daily working hours (WH or HY model) have a direct
impact only on the tax interaction term.
Remark 2 (No relocation). Assume relocation is not allowed. Then, MEC cannot change
if workdays are constant.42
An even stronger result can be derived for pure workhours models (WH): if there is no
relocation, changes in MECs are always zero owing to given workdays. In this case or if
redistribution is suciently moderate, welfare declines due to the negative tax interaction
term.
We can draw some conclusions on the number of commuting trips (workdays): rst, a
higher toll lowers VOTl in WD.
43 If substitution eects dominate dDij/dτ
t
hk < 0. Second,
there is only an income eect in WH since the toll does not directly aect the VOTs.
With head tax recycling this eect is oset on average, provided we neglect market based
changes. However, worker types facing high tolls have a larger tax liability than those
paying low tolls. Therefore, working hours of highly taxed workers increase (dhij/dτ
t
hk > 0,
if τ thkDij >
∣∣τ ls∣∣) while they decline for low taxed workers (dhij/dτ thk < 0, if τ thkDij < ∣∣τ ls∣∣).
In addition, workers can avoid high net taxation through relocation. This results in less
trac on highly congested routes. If congestion is high on the intra-city and suburb-city
links, we expect resorting to city-suburb and intra-suburban links.
Third, the decline in workdays diminishes congestion. This raises VOTl in some of the
LSMs inducing additional travel and congestion. Due to this congestion feedback, welfare
can be expected to increase in WD less than in WH in case of an increase in congestion
tolls.
By setting the marginal welfare change to zero and solving for τ thk we can derive the
optimal toll on route hk
(
τ thk
)∗
=
MECthk
Adjthk
(
− dF
dτ thk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
TIthk
Adjthk︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
REthk
Adjthk︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
. (26)
The optimal congestion tolls are spatially dierentiated except for the unlikely case that
the sum of the terms is equal for each tax. Because trac ows and labor supply decline
42If dψ/dτ thk = 0 and if D = D̄ it follows from (22) that dtij/dτ
t
hk = 0 and from (21) that MEC
t
hk = 0.
If dDij/dτ
t
hk 6= 0 then dtij/dτ thk 6= 0 and MECtτt
hk
6= 0.
43We implicitly assume that the rst round eect of the toll on the VOT exceeds market induced feedback
on wages and travel time if these run into the opposite direction.
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w.r.t. the toll, the rst two terms in (26) are of opposite sign. Nothing can be said about
redistribution. Hence, optimal tax rates are ambiguous.
Similar formulae can be derived for miles taxes and a cordon toll. In case of zoning44,
the tax-interaction eect does not exist but a land market distortion is added (see Appendix
D; see also Rhee et al., 2014). Since the latter does not directly depend on labor supply,
LSM is less important under zoning.
Our results will likely hold in a similar way when the approach is extended. First,
each relocation implies the use of another {i, j}. The same happens if we x locations and
allow for mode or route choice (De Palma and Lindsey, 2004). Travel time is also aected
if workers avoid peak hours by timing their work (Arnott et al., 1990; Hamermesh, 1999;
Winston, 2008).
Second consider telecommuting (e.g., Rhee, 2008). As commuting costs are xed costs
of a workday spent away from home, people would prefer to maximize telecommuting days
c.p. If leisure is homogeneous the choices of hours and telecommuting days are equivalent
and implicitly included in our model.
Third, adding a decision on weeks per year or participation (Anas and Liu, 2007) is
straightforward. Assume there are xed costs of a working week. This will also aect
commuting and, thus, the Pigouvian and the tax interaction terms in a very similar way
compared to the decision on days.
5 Simulations
Below we present the simulations. The numerical model is almost identical to the above
model apart from some minor adjustments. We specify functions and landownership and
add a current account.
5.1 Functional forms and model closure
We dene the random utility functions of worker type ij in the inhomogeneous and the
homogeneous case, respectively
U inhij = α
z lnZij + α
q ln qij + α
L
1 ln (`ijDij) + α
L
2 ln (lijLij) + εij ,
Uhomij = α
z lnZij + α
q ln qij + α
L ln (`ijDij + lijLij) + εij ,
where Zij = (
∑
k (zijk)
η)1/η is the CES subutility for consumption of local goods (Dixit
and Stiglitz, 1977), 1/(1 − η) is the elasticity of substitution and the αs are expenditure
shares. Each local representative rm produces a local commodity Xi with a constant
returns to scale CD technology Xi = BiQ
ωQi
i M
ωMi
i , ω
Q
i + ω
M
i = 1, using land Qi and labor
Mi, where B, ω
Q
i and ω
M
i are parameters.
We use the BPR (bureau of public roads) congestion function (e.g., Anas and Xu,
1999)45 to compute travel time tij on link ij. The current account
∑
i piΓi = [(1−Θ)
∑
i riAi]
states that the value of exports, with Γi as the exported goods, equals land rents paid to
44Zoning is known to be almost equivalent to congestion tolls (Pines and Sadka, 1985; Rhee et al., 2014).
45tij = g0
[
1 + g1
(
Fij
Kij
)g2]
where g1 > 0, g2 ≥ 1. g0 is the inverse of the free of congestion trac
speed. Since a total of Tij = tijFij hours is spent on link ij, the marginal social time of traveling is
∂Tij/∂Fij = t
′
ijFij + tij . The congestion externality is t
′
ijFij = g0g1g2
(
Fij
Kij
)g2
.
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absentee landowners. Θ is the local landlords' share of land.46 Clearings of local good
markets require Xk = N
∑
i,j ψijZijk + Γk.
5.2 Parameters and benchmark simulation
We calibrate a city with two zones, named City and Suburb, so that it approximates a
stylized medium-sizedd MSA (parameters see Table 4). Table 5 displays the benchmark
gures for the inhomogeneous leisure case.47 N = 500, 000 workers live in the city on 290
square miles of land. We assume an average household size of 2.5 (U.S. Census Bureau,
2012) so that the average population density is 4300 persons per square mile. The shares of
land allocated to roads is set at s1 = 0.45 and s2 = 0.20 to get a higher network density in
the City. The average intra-City (intra-Suburb) travel distance is 8 (16) miles per one-way
trip and the average distance of inter-urban (inter-zone) trips is 24 miles. Along with the
chosen parameter values for the BPR congestion function (Small and Verhoef, 2007) this
delivers realistic travel and congestion patterns. Average one-way commuting time is 31
minutes,48 total annual time delay per commuter is 31 hours49 and averaged MEC are 22
/c /mile.50
Utility parameters provide real expenditure shares for consumption and housing, and
reproduce time allocation patterns from the American Time Use Survey. Pure time spent
working (leisure time) on a workday is 8.3 (5.8) hours51 while 2 hours are used for traveling.
The annual number of workdays (non-workdays) is 263 (52). The number of shopping trips
exceeds the number of commutes (Anas, 2007).
We assume a higher (lower) labor (land) cost share in City's rms, so that labor inten-
sive rms locate in the City but land intensive rms in the Suburb. This results in reason-
able wage and rent proles. The average wage rate is 21.34 $/hour (City: 22.81 $/hour;
Suburb: 19.65 $/hour).52 The location parameters imply a population and employment
density peak in the City where the jobhousing ratio exceeds unity while it falls short of
unity in the Suburb (Cox, 2013; Levine, 1998; Sultana, 2002).
5.3 Eects of policies  numerical results
We run simulations for ve anti-congestion policies: (1) introduction of a Pigouvian con-
gestion toll, (2) an expansion of road capacity by 10 %, (3) a miles tax of 5 cents per
mile, (4) a cordon toll of $10 for entering the city, and (5) zoning that increases residential
land in the City and declines it in the Suburb by 4 percentage points each. We apply
four LSMs to each policy and, in addition, dierentiate with respect to revenue recycling
46For simplicity, we assume that commodities can be exported at zero transport costs. Export demands
are derived from a CD utility function of the outside world (absentee landlords) over all local goods with
uniform expenditure shares.
47The benchmark of the LSMs with homogeneous leisure, which is separately calculated, is very similar.
48Average one-way commuting time in MSAs (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011): 35 min (New York-
Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA); 33 min (Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-
WV); 31 min (Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI); 30 min (Winchester, VA-WV); 30 min (Riverside-San
Bernardino-Ontario, CA).
49According to the 2012 Urban Mobility Report (Schrank et al., 2012), the average annual delay per
auto commuter was 29 hours in medium MSAs in 2011; 23 hours in small MSAs (population ≤ 500,000);
and 37 hours in large MSAs (population 1 to 3 million).
50Parry and Small (2009) report peak-period MEC of 21 /c/mile for Washington, DC and 26 /c /mile for
Los Angeles.
51The U.S. Department of Labor (2013a) reports an average of 8.5 workhours of employed full time
persons on an average weekday (men: 8.8; women 8.1).
52The mean hourly wage is 22.33 $/hour in May 2013 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013b).
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Table 4: Benchmark parameters
Description Symbol Value
City characteristics
Land area [square mile] City|Suburb Ai 58|232
Travel distance [miles] ij m11|m12|m21|m22 8|24|24|1
Share of road area City|Suburb si 0.45|0.20
Price of goods in the City (numeraire) p1 50
Export share zone i φi 1/2
Households
Number of workers (full city) N 500,000
Time endowment [annual days|daily hours] E|e 315|16
Full expenditure share consumption αz 0.37
Share housing αq 0.27
Share (homogeneous) leisure αL 0.36
Share (inhomog.) leisure on workdays αL1 0.26
Share (inhomog.) leisure on non-work days α2L 0.10
Share of shopping trips on workdays b 0.50
Taste for shopping variety η 0.6
Spatial location taste heterogeneity Λ 3
Share urban landownership Θ 0.3
Labor tax rate τw 0.35
Firms
Labor cost share City|Suburb ωMi 0.90|0.70
Land cost share City|Suburb ωQi 0.10|0.30
Scale parameter production function B 0.70
Transport
Free ow travel time [hours/mile] g0 1/40
Parameters congestion function g1|g2 2.0|5.0
Road capacity scale parameter κ 0.68
Parameters in the benchmark model. Own choices.
(head tax vs. wage tax recycling) and landownership (mixed landownership, only absentee
landowners and only local landowners).
Table 6 shows equivalent variations (EV) in million USD per year. Surprisingly, the
signs change across the LSMs in half of the 30 variants. For example, if leisure is ho-
mogeneous price based policies with head tax recycling cause losses when workdays are
endogenous (WD) but gains when workdays are xed (WH). A general outcome is that
WH provides an upper limit but WD a lower limit of welfare eects of pricing policies
within each homogeneity class.53
In general, benets are higher under wage tax than head tax recycling due to the
positive revenue recycling eect which results from the reduced wage tax (Parry, 1995).
Considering planning instruments (road capacity expansion and zoning), all LSMs produce
similar eects. Expansion of road capacity unambiguously diminishes welfare due to the
negative eect of funding.
To get an idea why EVs dier we compare results of imposing Pigouvian congestion
tolls with head tax recycling under homogeneous leisure versus wage tax recycling with
inhomogeneous leisure (Case 1a and 1d in Table 7; others, see Appendix E). In general,
tolls dier across routes (rows 6-9) and the Suburb-City toll is the highest (4.997.74,
53If leisure taxation is absent complements to leisure should be taxed more heavily (Corlett and Hague,
1953).
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Table 5: Benchmark simulation - general model
Value
Workdays per year|non-work days per year 263|52
Hours on a workday spent working|leisure 8.3|5.8
Hours on a workday spent commuting|shopping 1.1|0.8
Hours on a non-work day spent leisure|shopping 12.0|4.0
Total labor supply|leisure demand [h/year] 2187|2164
Total commuting time|shopping time [hours/year] 272|417
Travel time delay|total travel time [hours/year] 31|689
Marginal external congestion cost [/c/mile] 22
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31
VOT of one hour on workday|non-work day [$/h] 13.87|12.97
Commuting trip pattern [million/year] ik 25.4|19.3|45.0|41.6
Gross income [$/year] 61,071
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1
hline Rent City/Suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95|2.22
Wage rate City/Suburb [$/h] 22.81| 19.65
Labor tax|Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 8171|−974
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197
Households  City|Suburb 168,687|331,313
Jobs  City|Suburb 268,099|231,901
Benchmark characteristics of all LSMs with inhomogeneous leisure using parameters of Table 2. The
benchmark of all LSMs with homogeneous leisure is similar. Source. own calculations.
rows 8a-8b). It is higher with wage tax recycling due to the additional revenue recycling
induced by the the increase in the supply of working hours (rows 2-3) resulting from the
tax reduction. This is the major reason why welfare increases (row 10b) whereas it declines
with head tax recycling (row 10a). Further, even though households urbanize in all LSMs,
relocation is weaker in WD (row 13b) where workers can respond to the toll by adjusting
commuting trips. In contrast, the relocation eect is stronger in WH (row 13a), where
commuters can avoid the toll only by relocating.54 Interestingly, the reduction in MECC
is similar across LSMs (row 4) which suggests that the missing opportunity of commuters
to adjust the frequency of commuting trips in WH is almost exactly oset by more intense
relocation. Further, people rely more on relocation in inhomogeneous leisure models where
non-work and working days are less substitutable.
Next, we vary the magnitude of the policies. Figure 1 shows the welfare eects for dif-
ferent levels of the miles tax (LHS) and cordon toll rate (RHS) in terms of EVs (equivalent
variations). The upper panels present results of wage tax recycling and inhomogeneous
leisure and the lower panels results of head tax recycling and homogeneous leisure. Dotted
graphs represent the workhours approach (WH), dashed graphs the workdays approach
(WD) and solid graphs the hybrid approach (HY) which we add to illustrate HY in a
specic case. Optimal tax and toll rates are higher under WH than under WD. Daily
working hours vary stronger than workdays if leisure is inhomogeneous and there is wage
tax recycling. In contrast, with homogeneous leisure and head tax recycling the revenue
54Levying congestion tolls raises population density in the City which is the main job center. Commuters
urbanize to economize on higher commuting costs. This is consistent with classical urban economic theory.
In contrast to residents, jobs suburbanize since land used as input by rms becomes relatively cheaper in
the Suburb. This is consistent with the literature on polycentric cities (see Anas and Xu, 1999).
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Table 6: Simulation overview - welfare eects of policies
Land- Inhomogeneous leisure Homogeneous leisure
Policy Recycling lord No. WH WD No. WH WD
1 Cong.tolla head tax mixed 1a 43 −17 6a 30 −109
2 Cong.toll head tax absentee 1b 56 −17 6b 76 −155
3 Cong.toll head tax urban 1c 17 −10 6c 2 −16
4 Cong.toll wage tax mixed 1d 202 13 6d 177 4
5 Cong.toll wage tax absentee 1e 217 16 6e 325 24
6 Cong.toll wage tax urban 1f 127 5 6f 15 −1
7 Road cap.b head tax mixed 2a −499 −633 7a −521 −507
8 Road cap. head tax absentee 2b −420 −589 7b −368 −385
9 Road cap. head tax urban 2c −732 −748 7c −808 −755
10 Road cap. wage tax mixed 2d −706 −669 7d −757 −715
11 Road cap. wage tax absentee 2e −580 −620 7e −552 −535
12 Road cap. wage tax urban 2f −1038 −785 7f −1139 −1070
13 Miles tax head tax mixed 3a 4 −6 8a 3 −46
14 Miles tax head tax absentee 3b 6 −5 8b 5 −40
15 Miles tax head tax urban 3c 1 −6 8c 1 −45
16 Miles tax wage tax mixed 3d 50 2 8d 53 0
17 Miles tax wage tax absentee 3e 47 3 8e 58 3
18 Miles tax wage tax urban 3f 46 1 8f 32 −2
19 Cord.tollc head tax mixed 4a 9 −27 9a 3 −143
20 Cord.toll head tax absentee 4b 12 −27 9b 14 −121
21 Cord.toll head tax urban 4c 2 −24 9c 1 −149
22 Cord.toll wage tax mixed 4d 123 −7 9d 128 −19
23 Cord.toll wage tax absentee 4e 115 −7 9e 140 −12
24 Cord.toll wage tax urban 4f 113 −8 9f 81 −31
25 Zoning head tax mixed 5a −16 −74 10a −54 −57
26 Zoning head tax absentee 5b 8 −38 10b 30 −9
27 Zoning head tax urban 5c −206 −195 10c −201 −198
28 Zoning wage tax mixed 5d −121 −91 10d −104 −102
29 Zoning wage tax absentee 5e −61 −65 10e −66 −69
30 Zoning wage tax urban 5f −647 −242 10f −667 −533
a Congestion toll. b Road capacities. c Cordon toll
Million USD per year. Congestion toll: Pigouvian congestion toll. Road capacity expansion: 10% increase
in infrastructure capacity. Miles tax: 5 /c /mile on commuting ($\approx$ 1.15 $/gallon at average fuel
economy, 23 miles/gallon). Cordon toll: $ 10 for entering the City. LUR (zoning): increasing (decreasing)
the residential land share by 4 percentage-points in the City (Suburbs). 100 million $ per year is about
1.4% of tax revenue and 0.3% of GDP). Source: own calculations.
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Table 7: Policy eects of Pigouvian congestion tolls
Case 1a  head tax recycling Inhomogeneous leisure Homogeneous leisure
WH WD WH WD
1a Workdays per year 0 −1 0 −4
2a Daily working hours 0 0 +0.02 +0.02
3a Total labor supply [h/year] +6 −6 +4 −31
4a MECC [/c/mile] −3 −3 −3 −3
5a VOT on a workday [$/h] −0.16 −0.35 −0.11 −0.59
6a Toll [$/trip] CityCity +1.54 +1.50 +1.37 +1.09
7a Toll [$/trip] CitySuburb +0.16 +0.14 +0.12 +0.09
8a Toll [$/trip] SuburbCity +7.33 +7.35 +6.01 +4.99
9a Toll [$/trip] SuburbSuburb +2.13 +2.04 +1.74 +1.36
10a EV [million $/year] +43 −17 +30 −109
11a Labor tax revenue [m $/y]a −65 −155 −48 −182
12a Head tax revenue [m $/y]a −817 −791 −653 −508
13a Workers in the City +3,745 +2,882 +2,988 +1,870
14a Jobs in the City −6,356 −4,971 −5,155 −3,598
Case 1d  wage tax recycling Inhomogeneous leisure Homogeneous leisure
WH WD WH WD
1b Workdays per year 0 0 0 0
2b Daily working hours +0.2 0 +0.1 0
3b Total labor supply [h/year] +51 +2 +45 +2
4b MECC [/c/mile] −2 −3 −2 −2
5b VOT on a workday [$/h] +0.57 −0.33 +0.46 −0.20
6b Toll [$/trip] CityCity 1.68 1.57 1.46 1.24
7b Toll [$/trip] CitySuburb 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10
8b Toll [$/trip] SuburbCity 7.74 7.52 6.28 5.49
9b Toll [$/trip] SuburbSuburb 2.22 2.06 1.79 1.52
10b EV [million $/year] +202 +13 +177 +4
11b Labor tax revenue [m $/y]a −778 −923 −592 −652
12b Head tax revenue [m $/y]a 0 0 0 0
13b Workers in the City +4,109 +3,171 +3,247 +2,322
14b Jobs in the City −5,618 −4,380 −4,540 −3,316
a) million $ per year. Results of the simulation of the introduction of Pigouvian congestion tolls with head
tax revenue recycling and mixed landownership. Source: own calculations.
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recycling eect is absent and optimal taxes are lower. Obviously, WD and WH span the
interval of the eects of pricing policies.
Figure 2: Welfare eects of congestion pricing policies
Inhomogeneous leisure  wage tax recycling
Homogeneous leisure  head tax recycling
The gure draws welfare changes in the whole urban area (equivalent variations in million US-$) for dierent
levels of the miles tax (LHS) and cordon tolls (RHS). The upper panels display results for wage tax recycling
and inhomogeneous leisure and the lower panels results for head-tax recycling and homogeneous leisure.
Dotted graphs represent the workhours approach (WH), dashed graphs the workdays approach (WD) and
solid graphs the hybrid approach (HY). Optimal tax and toll rates in WH are much higher than in WD.
Source: own calculations.
A note is in order. We applied the same benchmark to study the eects of the dierent
policies and modeling features. This implies that we used specic labor supply elasticities
(see Appendix E.5).55
6 Conclusions
How to model labor supply is a crucial decision when evaluating economic policies that
change xed costs of labor supply margins. It is crucial because it may aect both magni-
tudes and signs of welfare eects and its components as well as the optimal level of pricing
instruments. That is why we need a decision rule for selecting the appropriate labor supply
model.
Given that we do not know enough on elasticities of workdays or weeks, we suggest a
simple rule of thumb, which is: use the workhours as well as the workdays approach to span
the interval of results. The former provides the upper limit and the latter the lower limit
55We do not x average labor supply elasticities to avoid calibrating 150 dierent models. Instead we
use the same calibrated benchmark for all simulations within each homogeneity group. Elasticities are
then endogenous but almost constant.
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of optimal instrument levels and changes in welfare and its most important components
which are induced by the policies considered. If the issue is to determine whether results
are below (above) a threshold, applying only the workhours (workdays) model is sucient
if its outcome is below (above) the threshold. If elasticities are known, using the hybrid
approach is the best choice because it avoids extreme assumptions of either xed days or
xed daily hours. Concerning the homogeneity assumption of leisure, the nding is less
clear. In many cases the inhomogeneous leisure assumption provides the upper limits of
the results in the workhours model and the homogeneous leisure assumption the lower limit
of the results under the workdays approach.
In our application to congestion policies we nd that the dierent labor supply ap-
proaches results in very similar eects on commuting and congestion even though welfare
eects and eects on other economic variables may dier considerably. The reason for this
nding is that agents are exible enough to avoid xed costs of workdays, for instance, by
relocating. As a consequence, either a pure workhours approach or a workdays approach
may be a useful shortcut if one wants to examine eects of policies on congestion only,
provided travel can respond suciently. According to our results, all three approaches
provide similar ndings when applied to planning instruments (land-use restriction and
road-capacity expansion) and, thus, one is free to apply any of the LSMs when examining
these instruments.
Our analyses simplies in several ways. We expect equivalent results when considering
other trip purposes, the possibility to shift travel time away from the peak, mode choice
or route choice, as well as other extensions of the model such as heterogeneity of skills,
accidents, noise, pollution, or emission of greenhouse gases.
In general, our results emphasize that magnitude as well as sign may depend on la-
bor supply modeling. Hence, adding a decision on days or weeks may be appropriate
if their marginal costs dier from those of the other margins. Given the danger of de-
riving misleading ndings, our analysis underlines the importance of studying the actual
responses of employees in medium or long-term workdays, daily working hours, workweek
and worktiming to economic policies which change xed costs of the labor supply margins.
Unfortunately, there is hardly any empirical research on those topics. An exception is the
literature on income taxes with respect to hours of work and participation which, however,
does not consider workday decisions.
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A FOCs and VOTs for approach: HY with homogeneous leisure
On account of the additional restriction ` ≥ ¯̀, the Lagrangian is:
L = u
(
z, q,L1 + L2
`D+lL
, tzz, tD
)
+ λ {(wnh− c)D + I − (p+ cz) z}+ γ {E − L−D}
+ µ {eD − (h+ t)D − `D − btzz}+ ρ {eL− lL− (1− b) tzz}+ π
(
¯̀− `
)
D
FOCs (we do not display derivatives w.r.t. zq):
∂L
∂l
: uLL− ρL = 0→ uL = ρ (A.1)
∂L
∂L
: uLl − γ + ρ (e− l) = 0→ γ = eρ (A.2)
∂L
∂`
: uLD − µD − πD ≤ 0 ⊥ π ≥ 0→ uL
{
= µ if ` > ¯̀
= µ+ π if ` = ¯̀
(A.3)
∂L
∂D
: uL`+ utt = −λ (wnh− c) + γ − µ (e− h− t− `)− π
(
¯̀− `
)
(A.4)
∂L
∂h
: λwnD − µD = 0→ µ
λ
= wn (A.5)
Case 1 ` > ¯̀ (then π = 0). From FOCs
ρ
λ
=
µ
λ
= wn (A.6)
However, from (A.4) when using µe = γ and uL = µ (A.3)
µ
λ
=
wnh− c+ utλ t
h+ t
Both equations are equal if c = t = 0, which is not the case.
Case 2 If ` = ¯̀ then π > 0. Then from (A.3), (A.4), since γ = (µ+ π) e and wn = µ/λ
from (A.5):
π
λ
= −νtt+ c
e− ¯̀
(A.7)
where νt = w
n − utλ . Eventually, substitute (A.3) into (A.4), divide by λ and substitute
(A.5). Further use (A.7) and (A.2) and solve for ρ/λ. This yields VOTl for HY with
homogeneous leisure in Table 1.
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B Parry and Small, 2005 - Hybrid, inhomogeneous leisure
We assume, now, that non-commuting travel (which substitutes all travel in PS) depends
only on fuel and monetary travel costs (linear homogenous function, see PS)56
Mo = Mo (F o, Co) (B.1)
The superscript o denotes non-commuting trips. In addition, there are D commuting trips.
Total VMT M , total fuel consumption F and total monetary travel costs C are:
M = Mo +mD, F = F o + fD, C = Co + cD, (B.2)
where m is VMT per commuting trip. Costs and fuel consumption for commuting are
dened per two-way trip. Fuel and monetary costs can be arbitrarily chosen (mode choice,
car choice, fuel choice, fuel economy).
Total travel time per capita T is:
T = t (M)M, t′ > 0 (B.3)
where t is driving time per VMT that depends on total number of miles driven. To simplify
notations we write t ≡ t (M) in the following. Further, total travel time of non-commuting
is
T o = t (M)Mo (B.4)
We assumpe that pollutants, P , and accidents, A, do not depend on day of traveling, such
that they are dened exactly as in PS:
P = PF (F ) + PM (M) , P
′
F , P
′
M > 0 (B.5)
A = A (M) = a (M)M (B.6)
where a (M) is the accident rate per mile.
The monetary budget constraint is:
Z + (qF + τF )F + C = I = (1− τw)H. (B.7)
There are two time constraints: the rst for time on workdays, the second is the annual
days constraint:
H + L1 + T = eD; D + L = E, (B.8)
where L1 = `D (leisure on workdays).
The governments nances expenditure G by fuel taxes at rate τF and wage taxes at
rate τw on total labor:
τwH + τFF = G. (B.9)
56PS assume that time costs do not matter for travel decisions.
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B.1 Optimal gasoline tax formula
Some denitions
αFM = F/M ; α
o
FM =
F 0
M0
; αfm =
f
m
; αoCM =
Co
Mo
; αcm =
c
m
; (B.10)
ηMI ≡ (1− σm) ηMoI + σm
(
ηmI +
ηHI
εcHw
)
;
ηFF = −
dF
dτF
pF
F
; ηMM = −
dM
dτF
pF
M
; β =
ηMM
ηFF
;
I ≡ (1− τw)H; σm =
mD
M
εcHw = −
∂cH
∂τw
(1− τw)
H
; ηHI =
∂H
∂I
I
H
; εcDw = −
∂cD
∂τw
(1− τw)
D
.
implying that all elasticities are positively dened.
B.1.1 Utility maximization - HY inhomogeneous leisure
V (τF , τw;P,A, t) (B.11)
=
{
max
Z,Mo,Co,F o,m,`,L,D,h
u
(
ϕ (Z,Mo, tMo, G) ,MD, tMD,L1, L
)
− φ (P )− δ (A)
+ µM [M
o (F o, Co)−Mo]
+ µMD
[
m (f, c)D −MD
]
+ λ [(1− τw)H − Z − pF (F o + fD)− Co − cD]
+ µ
[
eD −H − tMD − L1 − tMo
]
+γ [E − L−D]}
Restrictions and utility are written in annual terms. Assume aggregate commuting
miles depend on fuel consumption and monetary costs.
Maximizing w.r.t. Z, Mo, MD, L1, L, D, H yields (after applying the Euler-Theorem
Mo = MoF oF
o +MoCoC
o (see PS) and m = mff +mcc)
d£
df
:
µMD
λ
mf = pF →
µMD
λ
=
pF
mf
= pFαfm + αcm
d£
dH
:
µ
λ
= 1− τw
d£
dL1
:
uL1
λ
=
µ
λ
= 1− τw
d£
dMD
:
uMD
λ
=
µMD
λ
+
(µ
λ
− ut
λ
)
t = pFαfm + αcm + νtt = pm,
where νt ≡ 1− τw −
ut
λ
d£
dD
:
µMD
λ
m− λ (pF f + c) + µe− γ = 0→
γ
λ
= (1− τw) e
d£
dL
:
uL
λ
=
γ
λ
= (1− τw) e
where αfm = f/m and αcm = c/m. The reason why VOT on a leisure day is (1− τw) e is
that the commuting cost component is part ofMD. We assume thatD has two components,
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one is fully substitutable with h and the other part is fully substitutable with m, which is
the miles depending component.
uZ
λ
= 1;
uL1
λ
= 1− τw;
uL
λ
=
1− τw
e
;
uMo
λ
= pM ;
uMD
λ
= pm
where the full consumer prices of a non-commuting VMT and a commuting VMT are
pM ≡ pFαoFM + αoCM + νot, pm ≡ pFαfm + αcm + νtt
with VTTs for non-commuting and commuting travel
νo ≡ (1− τw)−
uT o
λ
, νt ≡ (1− τw)−
ut
λ
.
Further, pF ≡ qF + τF and the VOT of an hour is 1− τw.
Partial derivatives are
∂pM
∂τF
= αoFM ;
∂pM
∂t
= νo (B.12)
∂pm
∂τF
= αfm;
∂pm
∂t
= νt
changes in travel time:
dt
dτF
= t′
(
dMo
dτF
+
dMD
dτF
)
= t′
dM
dτF
(B.13)
B.1.2 Dierentiate government budget
Demands are
Zo = Zo (pM , pm, τw) ; M
o = Mo (pM , pm, τw) ; H = H (pM , τw, pm) ; (B.14)
m = m (pM , pm, τw) ; D = D (pM , pm, τw) ;
MD = MD (pM , pm, τw) = m (pM , pm, τw)D (pM , pm, τw)
F = αFMo (τF )M
0 (pM , pm, τw) , (B.15)
FD = f (τF )M
D (pM , pm, τw)
Partial derivatives of V (tF , τw, t;P,A) and applying the envelope theorem (B.11):
∂V
∂τF
= −λ (F o + fD) ; ∂V
∂τw
= −λH; (B.16)
∂V
∂P
= −ϕ′ (P ) ; ∂V
∂A
= −δ′ (P ) ;
∂V
∂t
= −λ (νoMo + νtmD)
Totally dierentiating the government budget constraint (B.9) yields (at constant ex-
penditure)
dτw
dτF
= −
F + τF
dF
dτF
+ τw
dH
dτF
H
(B.17)
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B.1.3 Deriving the optimal fuel tax
Totally dierentiating indirect utility V (τF , τw, t;P,A) [note: θ = θ (τF , τw, t)] yields after
using (B.16) and (B.17) and Roy's identity.
1
λ
dV
dτF
=
1
λ
∂V
∂τF
+
1
λ
∂V
∂τw
dτw
dτF
+
1
λ
∂V
∂P
dP
dτF
+
1
λ
∂V
∂A
dA
dtF
+
1
λ
∂V
∂t
dt
dτF
=− F −H
(
−
F + τF
dF
dτF
+ τw
dH
dτF
H
)
− 1
λ
φ′P ′F︸ ︷︷ ︸
EPF
dF
dtF
− 1
λ
φ′M ′F︸ ︷︷ ︸
EPM
dM
dtF
− 1
λ
δ′A′︸ ︷︷ ︸
EA
dM
dtF
− (νoMo + νtmD) t′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ec
dM
dτF
Consolidating yields:
1
λ
dV
dτF
=
(
EPF − τF
)(
− dF
dτF
)
+
(
Ec + EPM + EA
)(
−dM
dτF
)
+ τw
dH
dτF
(B.18)
Look at τw
dH
dτw
in (B.18). Since pM , pm and θ only depend on τw, τF and t we can
rewrite H = H (τF , τw, t) (see PS) implying
dH
dτF
=
∂H
∂τF
+
∂H
∂t
dt
dτF
+
∂H
∂τw
dτw
dτF
(B.19)
Substituting into (B.17) and solving for dtw/dtF yields
dτw
dτF
= −
F + τF
dF
dτF
+ τw
(
∂H
∂τF
+ ∂H∂t
dt
dτF
)
H + τw
∂H
∂τw
(B.20)
Insert into (B.19) and multiply by τw to get (see PS)
τw
dH
dτF
= MEB · τF
dF
dτF
− MEB
∂H/∂τw
(
∂H
∂τF
H − ∂H
∂τw
F +H
∂H
∂t
dt
dτF
)
(B.21)
where
MEBH =
−τw ∂H∂τw
H + τw
∂H
∂τw
=
τwεHw
1− τw (1 + εHw)
(B.22)
Further, terms in brackets in (B.21) are due to (B.12):
∂H
∂τF
=
∂H
∂pM
∂pM
∂τF
+
∂H
∂pm
∂pm
∂τF
(B.23)
= αoFM
∂H
∂pM
+ αfm
∂H
∂pm
∂H
∂t
=
∂H
∂pM
∂pM
∂t
+
∂H
∂pm
∂pm
∂t
(B.24)
= νo
∂H
∂pM
+ νt
∂H
∂pm
.
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To perform simulations we apply the following manipulations. From Slutsky
∂H
∂pM
=
∂cH
∂pM
− ∂H
∂I
Mo;
∂H
∂τw
=
∂cH
∂τw
− ∂H
∂I
H; (B.25)
∂H
∂pm
=
∂cH
∂pm
− ∂H
∂I
MD;
∂D
∂τw
=
∂cD
∂τw
− ∂D
∂I
H
it follows that (B.23) and (B.24) change into (assume fD/F = mD/M = σm
∂H
∂τF
= αoFM
∂cH
∂pM
+ αfm
∂cH
∂pm
− F ∂H
∂I
(B.26)
∂H
∂t
= νo
∂cH
∂pM
+ νt
∂cH
∂pm
− νM ∂H
∂I
.
where σf ≡ fD/F and σm ≡MD/M and νM = νoMo+νtmD. Further due to symmetry
of the Slutsky substitution matrix:
∂cH
∂pM
=
∂cMo
∂τw
,
∂cH
∂pm
= D
∂cm
∂τw
+m
∂cD
∂τw
(B.27)
On account of the weak separability assumption all eects of τw on M occur via "a change
in disposable income (Layard and Walters 1978, p.166)" [see PS]:
∂cMo
∂τw
=
∂Mo
∂I
(1− τw)
∂cH
∂τw
,
∂cm
∂τw
=
∂m
∂I
(1− τw)
∂cH
∂τw
(B.28)
Then, from Slutsky we get
∂cH
∂pm
=
∂cMD
∂τw
= D
∂m
∂I
(1− τw)
∂cH
∂τw
+m
∂cD
∂τw
(B.29)
Using (B.28) and (B.29) we can rewrite (B.26) as
∂H
∂τF
H =− αoFM
∂Mo
∂I
(1− τw)
(
−∂
cH
∂τw
)
H − αfmD
∂m
∂I
(1− τw)
(
−∂
cH
∂τw
)
H
− f
(
−∂
cD
∂τw
)
H − F ∂H
∂I
H
respectively
∂H
∂t
=− νo∂M
o
∂I
(1− τw)
(
−∂
cH
∂τw
)
− νtD
∂m
∂I
(1− τw)
(
−∂
cH
∂τw
)
− νtm
(
−∂
cD
∂τw
)
− νM ∂H
∂I
.
Expanding and substituting elasticities implies
∂H
∂τF
H =− [(1− σf ) ηMoI + σfηmI ] εcHwF
H
1− τw
− σfεcDw
H
1− τw
− FηHI
H
1− τw
,
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respectively
∂H
∂t
H =− [(1− σm) ηMoI + σmηmI ] νMεcHW
H
1− τw
− νt
ν
σmε
c
DwM
H
1− τw
− ηHIνM
H
1− τw
To simplify, we assume νo = νt = ν and dene the aggregate income elasticity of miles as
57
ηMI ≡ (1− σm) ηMoI + σmηmI (B.30)
From Slutsky equation: ηHI = εHw − εcHw, thus:
∂H
∂τF
H − ∂H
∂τw
F = (1− ηMI) εcHwF
H
1− τw
− σmεcDwF
H
1− τw
, (B.31)
respectively
∂H
∂t
H = − [εHw − (1− ηMI) εcHw] νM
H
1− τw
− σmεcDwνM
H
1− τw
. (B.32)
Substitute (B.31) and (B.32) into (B.21) (note that εHw = − ∂H∂τw
1−τw
H ):
τw
dH
dτF
= −MEB · τF
(
− dF
dτF
)
(B.33)
+
MEB
εHw
(1− ηMI) εcHwF − σm
MEB
εHw
εcDwF
− MEB
εHw
[εHw − (1− ηMI) εcHw] νMt′
dM
dτF
− MEB
εHw
σmε
c
DwνMt
′dM
dτF
Next, equate (B.18) to zero and substitute (B.33). Solving for τF yields
τF =
MEC
1 +MEB
+
MEB
(1 +MEB) εHw
(1− ηMI) εcHw(
− dFdτF
1
F
) − σm MEB
(1 +MEB) εHw
εcDw(
− dFdτF
1
F
)
− MEB
(1 +MEB) εHw
[εHw − (1− ηMI) εcHw]Ec
dM
dτF(
− dFdτF
1
F
) − σm MEB
(1 +MEB) εHw
εcDwE
c dM
dτF(
− dFdτF
1
F
)
Since
MEBH
(1 +MEBH) εHw
=
τw
1− τw
, ηFF = −
dF
dτF
F
pF
we get
τF =
MEC
1 +MEB
+
[
(1− ηMI) εcHw
ηFF
− σm
εcDw
ηFF
]
pF τw
1− τw
−
dM
dτF
pF
ηFF
[
[εHw − (1− ηMI) εcHw] + σm
εcDw
ηFF
]
Ec
τw
1− τw
57We further assume that σf = σm implying that fD/F = M
D/M so that fuel consumption per VMT
is the same for commuting and non-commuting travel.
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Further, substituting β = ηMFηFF and ηMF = −
∂M
∂τF
pF
M
τF =
MEC
1 +MEB
+
[
(1− ηMI) εcHw
ηFF
− σm
εcDw
ηFF
]
pF τw
1− τw
+ β
M
F
Ec
[
[εHw − (1− ηMI) εcHw] + σm
εcDw
ηFF
]
τw
1− τw
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C Data and Monte Carlo Simulation
Table C.1: Parameters in the Monte Carlo Simulation
Parameter US UK
central
value
range
central
value
range
Compensated workdays elasticity εcDw 0.2 0.0-ε
c
Hw 0.2 0.0-ε
c
Hw
Compensated labor supply elasticity εcHw 0.35 0.35
Uncompensated labor supply elasticity εuHw 0.2 0.2
Uncompensated labor supply elasticity εuHw 0.2 0.2
VMT income elasticity ηM0I 0.6 0.3-0.9 0.9 0.4-1.2
VMT expenditure elasticity ηFF 0.6 0.3-0.9 0.9 0.4-1.2
VMT portion of gas price elasticity β 0.4 0.2-0.6 0.4 0.2-0.6
Workdays per year (days) 236.8 223.2
Share of non-commuting miles 0.72 0.725
Figure C.1: Comparison of LSMs in case of UK
A) fuel tax UK WD/WH B) fuel tax UK HY/WH C) fuel tax UK HY/WD
D) Ramsey UK WD/WH E) Ramsey UK HY/WH F) Ramsey UK HY/WD
Pairwise plots of optimal fuel taxes (upper panels; vertical and horizontal lines represent the UK fuel tax
in 2005: 2.80 BRP /c/gallon) and Ramsey tax terms (lower panels) for the UK for the LSMs. Each dot
represents the results for the identical parameter constellation. Panels A) and D): WD vs. WH, WH is
the upper limit for WD. Panels B) and E): HY vs. WH, WH is the upper limit for HY. Panel C) and F):
HY vs. WD, WD is the lower limit for HY. A few parameter combinations produce irregularities (division
by zero etc.) Source: own calculations.
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D General hybrid model: HY with inhomogeneous leisure
D.1 Congestion tolls with head tax recycling
Denitions and derivatives
Consolidate (10)-(13) to get the consolidated budget constraint
θlijE + I =
∑
k
Pijkzijk + riqij + w
n
j (E − Lij) `ij + θlijlijLij , (D.1)
where θlij ≡ V OTlY i (2). The full consumer price of shopping in zone k is
Pijk ≡ pk + czik +
[
bwnj + (1− b) θlij
]
tzik
For later reference we have
dθlij =
(
e− tij
e
)
dwnj −
wnj
e
dtij −
1
e
dcij (D.2)
dPijk = dpk + dc
z
ik − (1− b)
tzik
e
dcij − (1− b)
wnj t
z
ik
e
dtij
+
[
1− (1− b) tij
e
]
tzikdw
n
j (D.3)
Using (8)-(13) gives indirect utility. Since all prices depend on the policy parameters
τ thk and the recycling tax τ
ls we write
Vij
(
τ thk|∀hk, τ ls
)
= {maxu (zijk, qij ,L1ij ,L2ij) (D.4)
+λ
(
θlijeEij + I − wnj `ijDij − θlijlijLij −
∑
k
Pijkzijk − riqij
)}
,
For later use we totally dierentiate V w. r. t. policy parameters and apply the envelope
theorem (Yu and Rhee, 2011; Rhee et al., 2014) to (D.4)58, yielding
1
λij
dVij
dτ thk
= (eEij − lijLij)
dθlij
dτ thk
− `ijDij
dwnj
dτ thk
+
dARL
dτ thk
− dτ
ls
dτ thk
−
∑
l
zijl
dPijl
dτ thk
− qij
dri
dτ thk
.
Substituting (D.2), (D.3), the time budget constraints (11)-(13) and dening Hij ≡ hijDij
yields:
1
λij
dVij
dτ thk
= Hij
dwnj
dτ thk
− wnijDij
dtij
dτ thk
− δijDij (D.5)
+
dARL
dτ thk
− dτ
ls
dτ thk
− qij
dri
dτ thk
−
∑
l
zijl
dpl
dτ thk
.
where we assume that monetary transport costs other than tolls are constant. δij is an
indicator set to unity if ij = hk and zero otherwise.
From Xi = f (Qi,Mi) Euler's theorem implies dXi = fQdQi + fMdMi. Multiplied by
pi and due to prot maximization:
pidXi = ridQi + widMi. (D.6)
58This is equivalent to applying Roy's identity to V
(
Pijk|∀ijk, ri, wnj , θlij , θlijeEij + I
)
.
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Totally dierentiate zero prots piXi = wiMi + riQi :
pidXi +Xidpi = widMi +Midwi + ridQi +Qidri.
Plug in (D.6) yields
Xidpi = Midwi +Qidri. (D.7)
Dierentiating the government budget constraint (14) w.r.t. to τ thk:
dτ ls
dτ thk
=
1
N
∑
siAi
dri
dτ thk
− 1
N
Thk −
1
N
∑
i,j
τ tij
dT tij
dτ thk
− τ
w
N
dTw
dτ thk
(D.8)
Eventually, the population has to be fully distributed across the city. This is achieved
because
∑
i,j ψij = 1. There are six market clearing conditions plus the government budget
constraint and seven unknowns:{
r1, r2, p1, p2, w1, w2, τ
ls
}
.
For later use we totally dierentiate the market clearing conditions (16)(D.10):
dXi = N
∑
j,k
(ψijdzijk + zijkdψij) (D.9)
dMj = N
∑
i
(ψijdHij + hijDijdψij) (D.10)
0 = dQi +N
∑
j
(ψijdqij + qijdψij) (D.11)
Eventually, dierentiating ALR ≡ 1N
∑
i riAi w. r. t. the policy variable:
dALR
dτ tlh
= N
∑
i,j
(
ψijr
q
i
dqi
dτ tlh
+ ψijqi
dri
dτ tlh
+ rqi qi
dψij
dτ tlh
)
(D.12)
+
∑
i
(
ri
dQi
dτ tlh
+Qi
dri
dτ tlh
)
+
∑
i
siAi
dri
dτ tlh
.
Marginal welfare changes with lump sum recycling
Plugging (D.5) into (19) yields for the congestion toll
dW
dτ thk
=−N
∑
i
∑
j
ψijλijw
n
jDij
dtij
dτ thk
−NψhkλhkDhk (D.13)
+N (1− τw)
∑
i,j
ψijλijHij
dwj
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijλijzijl
dpl
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j
ψijλijqij
dri
dτ thk
+Nλ
(
dALR
dτ thk
− dτ
ls
dτ thk
)
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Using (D.12) to substitute dALR
dτ thk
and (D.8), the derivatives of (15) w. r. t. τ thk to substitute
dτ ls
dτ thk
expands (D.13)
1
λ
dW
dτ thk
=− N
λ
∑
i,j
ψijλijDijw
n
j
dtij
dτ thk
(D.14)
+
N
λ
(1− τw)
∑
i,j
ψijλijHij
dwj
dτ thk
− N
λ
∑
i,j,l
ψijλijzijl
dpl
dτ thk
− N
λ
∑
i,j
ψijλijqi
dri
dτ thk
+N
∑
i
(
ψijri
dqi
dτ thk
+ ψijqi
dri
dτ thk
+ riqi
dψij
dτ thk
)
+
∑
i
(
ri
dQi
dτ thk
+Qi
dri
dτ thk
)
+
∑
i
siAi
dri
dτ thk
−
∑
siAi
dri
dτ thk
+
N∑
j
ψkjDkj +N
∑
j,j 6=k
ψjkDjk

︸ ︷︷ ︸∑
i,j ψijδ
kDij
+NψhkDhk −
N
λ
λhkψhkDhk +N
∑
i,j
τ tij
(
ψij
dDij
dτ thk
+Dij
dψij
dtauthk
)
+ τwN
∑
i,j
(
ψijwj
dHij
dτ thk
+ wjhijDij
dψij
dτ thk
+ ψijhijDij
dwj
dτ thk
)
.
After expanding (D.14) by λ times dierent terms, we have
1
λ
dW
dτ thk
= MECthk
(
− dF
dτ thk
)
(D.15)
+N
∑
i,j
ψijHij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lj
dwj
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijzijl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xl
dpl
dτ thk
+
∑
i
Qi
dri
dτ thk
+
∑
i
∑
j
N
(
ψijri
dqi
dτ thk
+ riqi
dψij
dτ thk
)
+ ri
dQi
dτ thk

+N
ψhkDhk +∑
i,j
τ tij
(
ψij
dDij
dτ thk
+Dij
dψij
dτ thk
)
+ τwN
∑
i,j
(
ψijwj
dHij
dτ thk
+ wjhijDij
dψij
dτ thk
)
+MECthk
(
− dF
dτ thk
)
(φmechk − 1) + Y thk
(
φyhk − 1
)
−NψhkDhk
(
φtollhk − 1
)
− τwN
∑
i,j
ψijHij
dwj
dτ thk
(φwtaxhk − 1) .
where we applied the denitions for price induced changes in average market income minus
expenditure, Y , the sum of individual utility values of price induced changes in market
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income minus expenditures, and the sum of individual utility values of MECs
Y thk ≡ N
∑
i,j
ψijhijDij
dwj
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijzijl
dpl
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j
ψijqi
dri
dτ thk
(D.16)
ythk ≡ N
∑
i,j
ψijλijhijDij
dwj
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijλijzijl
dpl
dτ thk
−N
∑
i,j
ψijλijqi
drqi
dτ thk
(D.17)
meccthk ≡ N
∑
i,j
ψijλijDijw
n
j
dtij/dτ
t
hk
dF/dτ thk
. (D.18)
Twtaxhk ≡ Nτw
∑
i,j
ψijHij
dwj
dτ thk
(
1− φTwtax
)
.
Further, distributional characteristics are:
φyhk ≡
ythk
λY thk
, φmechk ≡
mecthk
λMECthk
, φtollhk ≡
λhk
λ
(D.19)
φwtax =
τw
∑
i,j ψijλijHij
dwj
dτ thk
λτw
∑
i,j ψijHij
dwj
dτ thk
The second row in (D.15) gives the average change in income minus expenditure due to
changes in market prices. The third row represents behavioral changes in the land market
and the fourth and fth row display changes in tax revenue due to behavior responses.
The last rows represent redistribution eects due to dierences in the MUI between worker
types. By inserting (D.7) (D.15) simplies to (20)
39
D.2 Land use type regulation: general case (HY) with homogeneous
leisure and no restriction
With zoning we have (ζ (1− si)Ai =
∑
ψijqij , (1− ζ) (1− si)Ai = Qi). Then totally
dierentiating land market clearing conditions leads to:
dQi
dζ
= −N
∑
j
(
ψij
dqij
dζ
+ qij
dψij
dζ
)
(D.20)
For land-use regulation ζi we get an expression similar to (D.13)
dW
dζk
= −N
∑
i,j
ψijλijw
n
jDij
dtij
dζk
+N (1− τw)
∑
i,j
ψijλijHij
dwj
dζk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijλijzijl
dpl
dζk
−N
∑
i,j
ψijλijqij
drqi
dζk
+Nλ
dALR
dζk
−Nλdτ
ls
dζk
.
Using (D.12) and (D.8) expands (D.13)
dW
dζk
= −N
∑
i,j
ψijλijw
n
jDij
dtij
dζk
(D.21)
+N (1− τw)
∑
i,j
ψijλijhijDij
dwj
dζk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijλijzijl
dpl
dζk
−N
∑
i,j
ψijλijqij
drqi
dζk
+ λN
∑
i
(
ψijr
q
i
dqi
dζk
+ ψijqi
drqi
dζk
+ rqi qi
dψij
dζk
)
+ λ
∑
i
(
rQi
dQi
dζk
+Qi
drQi
dζk
)
+ τwN
∑
i,j
(
ψijwj
dHij
dζk
+ wjhijDij
dψij
dζk
+ ψijhijDij
dwj
dζk
)
.
We expand this by λ times dierent terms and using several denitions equivalent to
(21), (D.16)(D.18) and (D.19) (φtollζk = 0, dζk instead of dτ
t
hk and r
q instead of r) yielding
1
λ
dW
dζk
= MECζk
(
− dF
dζk
)
+
∑
i
[(
rQi − r
q
i
) dQi
dζk
]
+ (D.22)
+N
∑
i,j
ψijhijDij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Lj
dwj
dζk
−N
∑
i,j,l
ψijzijl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xl
dpl
dζk
+
∑
i
Qi
drQi
dζk︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 from production and zero prots (D.7)
τwN
∑
i,j
(
ψijwj
dHij
dζk
+ wjhijDij
dψij
dζk
)
+MECζk
(
− dF
dζk
)(
φmecζk − 1
)
+ Yζk
(
φyζk − 1
)
(D.23)
− τwN
∑
i,j
ψijHij
dwj
dζk
(φwtaxζk − 1) .
where we used (N
∑
j
(
ψij
dqij
dζ + qij
dψij
dζ
)
− dQidζ from (D.11)) Dening the third row as the
tax interaction term and the fourth row as the redistribution term yields
1
λ
dW
dζk
= MECζk
(
− dF
dζk
)
+ TIζk +N
∑
i
(
rqi − r
Q
i
)
(1− si)Ai +REζk. (D.24)
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Concerning land-use policy, ζ, or capacity enhancement all LSMs provide similar ndings.
The welfare change of zoning shows that labor supply aects only TI, while the land market
distortion, i.e. the third term on the RHS, does not depend on labor supply.
E Detailed Tables for other policies
Table E.1: Policy eects of road capacity expansion with inhomogeneous leisure
Road capacity expansion - Case 2a Benchmark WH WD
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0 −1
Non-work days per year 52 0 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 +0.2/−0.1 0/+0.1
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 −0.1/0 −0.1/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 +0.1/−0.1 +0.1/−0.1
Total labor supply [h/year] 2187 +41 +7
Total leisure demand [h/year] 2164 −23 +13
Total commuting time on workdays [h/year] 272 −8 −8
Total shopping time [h/year] 417 −8 −12
Travel/Transport/Trac
Travel time delay [h/year] 31 −10 −10
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22 −7 −8
Total travel time [h/year] 689 −18 −20
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31 −1 −1
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/h] 13.87 −0.06 −0.71
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CityCity 25.4 −0.5 −0.4
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CitySuburb 19.3 −0.4 −0.4
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbCity 45.0 +0.7 +0.9
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbSuburb 41.6 +0.2 +0.4
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071 +1,247 +375
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 −10 −15
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778 −345 −354
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +6.3 −0.4
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 +0.4 0
EV [million $/year]  −499 −633
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.36/+0.06+0.28/+0.02
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65−0.15/−0.01−0.12/+0.01
Government
Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171 +119 +6
Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974 +964 +959
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197 +1083 +965
Location
Households  City 168,687 −3,556 −3,706
Households  Suburb 331,313 +3,556 +3,706
Jobs  City 268,099 +603 +686
Jobs  Suburb 231,901 −603 −686
a million per year, b million $ per year
41
Table E.2: Policy eects of a miles tax with inhomogeneous leisure
Miles Tax - Case 3a Benchmark WH WD
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0 −1
Leisure days per year 52 0 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 0/0 0/0
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 0/0 0/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 0/0 +0.1/−0.1
Total labor supply [h/year] 2187 +1 −2
Total leisure demand [h/year] 2164 0 +3
Total commuting time on workdays [h/year] 272 0 −1
Total shopping time [h/year] 417 −1 −1
Travel/Transport/Trac
Travel time delay [h/year] 31 0 0
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22 0 0
Total travel time [hours/year] 689 −1 −2
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31 0 0
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/h] 13.87 0 −0.01
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CityCity 25.4 +0.2 +0.2
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CitySuburb 19.3 −0.1 −0.2
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbCity 45.0 −0.2 −0.2
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbSuburb 41.6 +0.1 0
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071 +19 −55
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 0 0
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778 −3 −5
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +0.2 −0.3
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 ∼0 ∼0
EV [million $/year]  +4 −6
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.01/0 +0.01/0
Wage rate city/suburb [$/h] 22.81/19.65−0.01/0 −0.01/0
Government
Labor tax revenue [m.$/y.]b 8171 +2 −7
Lump-sum tax revenue [m.$/y.]b 974 −237 −237
Miles tax revenue [m.$/y.]b +241 +241
Infrastructure costs [m.$/y.]b 7197 +6 −4
Location
Households  City 168,687 +155 +84
Households  Suburb 331,313 −155 −84
Jobs  City 268,099 +9 +21
Jobs  Suburb 231,901 −9 −21
a million per year, b million $ per year
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Table E.3: Policy eects of a cordon toll with inhomogeneous leisure
Cordon Toll - Case 4a Benchmark WH WD
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0 −1
Non-work days per year 52 0 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 +0.1/0 0/+0.1
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 0/0 −0.1/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 0/0 +0.1/−0.1
Total labor supply [h/year] 2187 +3 −4
Total leisure demand [h/year] 2164 +3 +8
Total commuting time on workdays [h/year] 272 −6 −7
Total shopping time [h/year] 417 0 −1
Travel/Transport/Trac
Travel time delay [h/year] 31 −3 −3
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22 −2 −2
Total travel time [h/year] 689 −6 −8
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31 −1 −1
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/h] 13.87 −0.04 −0.08
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CityCity 25.4 +1.1 +1.0
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CitySuburb 19.3 −1.2 −1.3
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbCity 45.0 −1.7 −1.7
Commuting trips [m./y]a SuburbSuburb 41.6 +1.8 +1.6
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071 −53 −392
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 0 −1
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778 −5 −14
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +0.5 −1.0
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 0 −0.2
EV [million $/year]  0.009 −0.027
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.1/0 −0.02/−0.01
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65−0.01/−0.09−0.01/−0.20
Government
Labor tax revenue [m. $/y]b 8171 −8 −52
Lump-sum tax revenue [m. $/y]b 974 −608 −603
Cordon toll revenue [m. $/y]b +614 +613
Infrastructure costs [m. $/y]b 7197 −2 −42
Location
Households  City 168,687 −413 −610
Households  Suburb 331,313 +413 +610
Jobs  City 268,099 −2,792 −2,044
Jobs  Suburb 231,901 +2,792 +2,044
a million per year, b million $ per year
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Table E.4: Policy eects of Zoning with inhomogeneous leisure
Zoning - Case 5a Benchmark WH HY WD
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0 −1 −1
Leisure days per year 52 0 +1 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 0.1/0 +0.1/0 0/+0.1
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 −0.1/0 −0.1/0 −0.1/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 +0.1/−0.1 0/0 +0.1/−0.1
Total labor supply [h/year] 2187 +22 +24 −19
Total leisure demand [h/year] 2164 −12 −15 +30
Total commuting time on workdays [h/year] 272 −4 −4 −4
Total shopping time [h/year] 417 −5 −5 −7
Travel/Transport/Trac
Travel time delay [h/year] 31 −4 −3 −3
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22 −3 −3 −3
Total travel time [hours/year] 689 −10 −9 −11
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31 0 0 0
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/h] 13.87 −0.34 −0.35 −0.63
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CityCity 25.4 +1.2 +1.2 +1.1
Commuting trips [m./y.]a CitySuburb 19.3 +1.1 +1.1 +1.1
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbCity 45.0 −1.3 −1.2 −1.2
Commuting trips [m./y.]a SuburbSuburb 41.6 −0.9 −0.9 −0.8
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071 −749 −680 −1,106
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 −4 −4 −6
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778 −388 −388 −388
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +5.5 +6.1 +2.5
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 −0.4 −0.4 −0.6
EV [million $/year]  −16 −6 −74
Rent city: housing/business [$/sqr feet] 5.95 −0.47/+1.89−0.46/+1.89−0.50/+1.84
Rent suburb: housing/business [$/sqr feet] 2.22 +0.06/−0.27+0.00/−0.27+0.04/−0.26
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65−0.69/−0.35−0.69/−0.35−0.68/−0.33
Government
Labor tax revenue [m. $/year]b 8171 −65 −87 −155
Lump-sum tax revenue [m. $/year]b 974 −817 −804 −791
Infrastructure costs [m. $/year]b 7197 +15 −13 −56
Location
Households  City 168,687 +8,398 +8,475 +8,209
Households  Suburb 331,313 −8,398 −8,475 −8,209
Jobs  City 268,099 −770 −768 −817
Jobs  Suburb 231,901 +770 +768 +817
a) million per year, b) million $ per year
Table E.5: Congestion tolls and labor supply elasticities
Inhomog. leisure Homog. leisure
WH HY WD WH HY WD
1 Uncomp. elast. of labor supply +0.20 +0.22 +0.03 +0.21 +0.20 +0.21
2 Uncomp. elast. of days supply +0.00 +0.02 +0.03 +0.00 +0.26 +0.21
3 Uncomp. elast. of daily hours +0.20 +0.20 +0.00 +0.21 −0.06 +0.00
4 Comp. elast. of labor supply +0.58 +0.66 +0.11 +0.66 +0.64 +0.64
5 Comp. elast. of annual days +0.00 +0.10 +0.11 +0.00 +0.64 +0.64
6 Comp. elast. of daily hours +0.58 +0.56 +0.00 +0.66 +0.00 +0.00
Average benchmark elasticities. HY hybrid approach, WH workhours approach, WD workdays approach.
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